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It’sallbs 2 years, 9 months ago.
Russian Counter-Electronic Warfare Systems- The USS Donald Cook As A Case Study
This happened in 2014 ad we can only deduce the Russian systems are far more powerful today.Based on the manner the US conducts its ‘upgrades’ I do not see any real change to the Aegis system
SitRep C4SIR says this
- While we fought what we considered to be a relatively unsophisticated threat in the Middle East, we took our eyes off of the Russian “sleeping bear.” As events unfolded in the Ukraine and Syria, however, it has become increasingly clear that not only did it not slumber, but Russia has continued to modernize and grow its already formidable Electronic Warfare (EW) capability. It was powerful during Cold War days – today it is no less than awe-inspiring.
The US State Department acknowledged that the crew of the destroyer USS Donald Cook has been gravely demoralized ever since their vessel was flown over in the Black Sea by a Russian Sukhoi-24 (Su-24) fighter jet which carried neither bombs nor missiles but only an electronic warfare device.
On 10 April 2014, the USS Donald Cook entered the waters of the Black Sea and on 12 April a Russian Su-24 tactical bomber flew over the vessel triggering an incident that, according to several media reports, completely demoralized its crew, so much so that the Pentagon issued a protest [1].
The USS Donald Cook (DDG-75) is a 4th generation guided missile destroyer whose key weapons are Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range of up to 2,500 kilometers, and capable of carrying nuclear explosives. This ship carries 56 Tomahawk missiles in standard mode, and 96 missiles in attack mode
The US destroyer is equipped with the most recent Aegis Combat System. It is an integrated naval weapons systems which can link together the missile defense systems of all vessels embedded within the same network, so as to ensure the detection, tracking and destruction of hundreds of targets at the same time. In addition, the USS Donald Cook is equipped with 4 large radars, whose power is comparable to that of several stations. For protection, it carries more than fifty anti-aircraft missiles of various types.
Meanwhile, the Russian Su-24 that buzzed the USS Donald Cook carried neither bombs nor missiles but only a basket mounted under the fuselage, which, according to the Russian newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, contained a Russian electronic warfare device called Khibiny.
As the Russian jet approached the US vessel, the electronic device disabled all radars, control circuits, systems, information transmission, etc. on board the US destroyer. In other words, the all-powerful Aegis system, now hooked up – or about to be – with the defense systems installed on NATO’s most modern ships was shut down, as turning off the TV set with the remote control.
The Russian Su-24 then simulated a missile attack against the USS Donald Cook, which was left literally deaf and blind. As if carrying out a training exercise, the Russian aircraft – unarmed – repeated the same maneuver 12 times before flying away.
A Russian KA-27 Helix helicopter also made seven passes around the USS Donald Cook, taking pictures. The nearest Russian territory was about 70 nautical miles away in its enclave of Kaliningrad, which sits between Lithuania and Poland.
In the first public account of the incident, the official version said the Russian Su-24 Fencer flew within 1,000 yards (900 metres) of the USS Donald Cook, and at about 500ft (150 metres) above sea level.
The fighter appeared to be unarmed and was never in danger of coming in contact with the ship, said the official. The passes, which occurred in the early evening there, ended without incident.
The official also said that a Russian navy ship, a frigate, has been shadowing the US warship, remaining within visual distance but not close enough to be unsafe.
Apparently, all efforts to revive the “Aegis” and provide target information for the defence failed. Russia’s reaction to military pressure from the United States was profoundly calm, feels the Russian political scientist Pavel Zolotarev:
- The demonstration was original enough. A bomber without any weapons, but having onboard equipment for jamming enemy radar, worked against a destroyer equipped with “Aegis”, the most modern system of air and missile defence. But this system of mobile location, in this case the ship, has a significant drawback. That is, the target tracking capabilities
- They work well when there is a number of these ships which can coordinate with each other somehow. In this case there was just one destroyer. And, apparently, the algorithm of the radar in the “Aegis” system on the destroyer did not load under the influence of jamming by the Su-24. It was therefore not only a nervous reaction to the fact of flying around by the Russin bomber which was common practice during the Cold War.
- The reaction of the Americans was due to the fact that Aegis os the most modern electronic warfare system available , especially its informative or radar part, did not work adequately. Therefore, there was such a nervous reaction to the whole episode.
What are the possible consequences of the incident provoked by the U.S. in the Black Sea? Pavel Zolotarev forecasts:
- I think that Americans are somehow going to reflect on improving the system “Aegis”. This is a purely military aspect. In political terms, there is hardly any likelihood of demonstrative steps by either side. That is enough. Meanwhile, for Americans it is a very unpleasant moment. In general, the missile defence system which they deploy involves huge expenditures.
- They have to prove each time that it is necessary to allocate funds from the budget. At the same time, the ground component of the ABM was tested in ideal conditions and showed a low efficiency. This fact is concealed by the Pentagon. The most modern component, the sea-based system “Aegis” also showed its shortcomings in the present case.
The system with which the Russian Su-24 shocked the American destroyer “Donald Cook” has the code name “Khibiny”. This is the name of the mountain range on the Kola Peninsula in the Arctic Circle. “Khibiny” is the newest complex for radioelectronic jamming of the enemy. They will be installed on all the advanced Russian planes .
Recently the complex has undergone regular testing exercises on the ground in Buryatia. Apparently, the tests which were conducted under conditions as close to real as possible, were successful.
After that, the Donald Cook immediately set sail towards a port in Romania.
Since that incident, which the Atlanticist media (Western MSM) have carefully covered up despite the widespread reactions sparked among defense industry experts, no US ship has ever approached Russian territorial waters again.
According to some specialized media, 27 sailors from the USS Donald Cook requested to be relieved from active service.
Vladimir Balybine – director of the research center on electronic warfare and the evaluation of so-called “visibility reduction” techniques attached to the Russian Air Force Academy – made the following comment:
“The more a radio-electronic system is complex, the easier it is to disable it through the use of electronic warfare.”
In Syria Russian electronic units are forcing RAF bomber crews to abort missions by hacking into their systems, sources revealed.
At least three sorties, two involving RAF Tornadoes, the other a Typhoon, were hacked over the last few weeks.
In two cases, the attacks were successfully intercepted by RAF weapons aircrew. However, both missions had to be aborted to void the possibility of bombs landing on incorrect targets.
In another case, a bomber was hit 30 seconds after it had already accurately dropped its payload, rendering the attack useless.
The incidents were witnessed by the crews of nearby AWACS surveillance aircraft.
Radio-electronic warfare systems are used not only as an “attack” resource but also to make forces invisible to the enemy’s missiles and planes during combat.
For example, Russia’s Ka-52 combat helicopters, which were first “baptized” in the skies over Syria, have been equipped with the Vitebsk and the President individual protection systems.
“They cause interference for missiles with optical and infrared homing warheads, creating particular electronic ‘traps’ in the range of interference. They also inform the pilot of the approaching enemy missile. Depending on the type of warhead, they can turn it off from its trajectory as it’s flying towards the target,” said editor-in-chief of Arsenal Otechestva (Arsenal of the Fatherland) magazine Viktor Murakhovsky.
This is an extract from SITREP C4SIR
U.S. Vulnerabilities: During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Army invested an enormous amount of resources in spectrum-using C4ISR capabilities – our ground forces are Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS)-enabled with wireless devices such as never before. Every Soldier and vehicle is a sensor and a multiple emitter.
We have “eyes” and “ears” that reach from ground platforms to aerostats to Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to rotary and fixed-wing aircraft. All of these platforms are networked via terrestrial radio or SATCOM. Every element in a combat theater, from an RF logistics tag on a crate of parts to a Stryker to a Command Post, is dependent upon the spectrum.
“The U.S. has placed increasingly significant importance on information superiority as one of the keys to prevailing in conflict against other forces throughout the world. That superiority is built upon the sensing of ISR assets, the ability to communicate what these sensors see to all required elements of the fight, the geographic and temporal coordination of military forces, and using all of that to outmaneuver the actions of potential adversaries. The dependence on information has not gone unnoticed in the rest of the world,”a 2015 Defense Science Board report concluded.
Early Soviet EW: During the Cold War, the former Soviet Union recognized the importance of Electronic Warfare (EW) and made a major investment in electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), as well as lethal and nonlethal countermeasures. Soviet writings on EW are included under broader topics such as security, command and control, reconnaissance, air defense, and camouflage. This treatment of electronic warfare in the context of routine operations indicates that the Soviets consider EW to be integral to all combat actions.
Rebuilding Capability: The post-Soviet collapse of the Russian economic base caused the quality of the Russian armed forces to decline as well. The Georgian Conflict in 2008 was a wake-up call for Russian forces. The Soviet armed forces had a highly developed EW capacity, but this Soviet legacy had been squandered over the years.
The ineffectiveness of Russian EW systems, during the military operations in Georgia, was later acknowledged by the General Staff. Although “a Russian victory was predestined because of the Russian forces” overwhelming numerical advantage, but weaknesses in Russian EW were obvious. Even before the brief Georgian conflict, Russia had begun the process of creating independent EW troops directly under the General Staff – complete with modern Russian technology and organization.
Although the Russian air campaign was largely unsuccessful because of an inability to overcome Georgian air defense radars, unmodernized Russian ground EW systems were still able to successfully shut down Georgian Army C2. Nodar Kharshiladze, a former Georgian defense official, said that he considered communications the single weakest spot in the Georgian army, “Our military… did not know how to switch to another channel, when the Russians started to jam our radio waves.”
Modernisation: As activities in the Ukraine and Syria continue to unfold, we are seeing the results of Russia’s decade-long, intensive modernization of EW forces. According to a 2011 report in the respected publication, Global Security,
“Electronic countermeasures (ECM) have been noted in all Soviet forces. Ground forces continue to introduce new jammers, as well as a new series of improved signals intelligence (SIGINT) vehicles. The air forces have numerous aircraft devoted to EW as escort and standoff jammer platforms. Also since 1979, there had been increased emphasis on Russian offensive, penetrating air forces equipped with ECM and accompanied by dedicated EW aircraft. Strategic fixed jammers were located throughout the Soviet Union.”
The Ukraine: Russian forces in the Ukraine have been able to ground Ukrainian UASs – rendering them incapable of providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). They are jamming air defense radars and they are nullifying command and control efforts. These capabilities were on display from the very start of the Russian incursion into Crimea in the spring of 2014. Shortly after Russian forces began rolling into the region, Ukrainian troops began to find that their “radios and phones were unusable for hours at a time.
Meanwhile, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, an international conflict-monitoring group, has consistently reported that its drones watching the conflict in eastern Ukraine have been ‘subject to military-grade GPS jamming,’ forcing monitors to scrub missions taking stock of the war below.”
Doctrine: The Russians now have a full Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Electronic Warfare Capability, based around the doctrine of Radio Electronic Combat (REC). “REC combined signals intelligence, direction finding, intensive jamming, deception, and destructive fires to attack enemy organizations and systems through their means of control.
The purpose of REC is to limit, delay, or nullify the enemy’s use of his command and control systems, while protecting Russian systems by electronic counter-countermeasures. An estimated goal of the system is to destroy or to disrupt a majority of the enemy’s command, control, and weapon system communications, either by jamming or by destructive fires,” Global Security reported.[9] REC targets include:
Artillery, rocket, and air force units that possess nuclear projectiles or missiles and their associated control system.
Command posts, observation posts, communications centers, and radar stations.Field artillery, tactical air force, and air defense units limited to conventional firepower.
Reserve forces and logistics centers.
Point targets that may jeopardize advancing Russian forces, e.g, dug-in tanks, antitank guided missile emplacements, bunkers, and direct fire guns
Technology: Russian forces combine a variety of equipment and platforms to achieve these effects. The single most important thing to note is that Russian EW forces have the capability to degrade or defeat US Ground Force C4 capabilities, including GPS/Position-Navigation and Timing (PNT) capabilities, and air defense and fires radars – all US Army spectrum using emitters from fires control systems to SATCOM radios to cellphones are targeted and can be affected.
Equipment includes UASs as well as rotary and fixed-wing aviation equipped with Electronic Attack (EA) capabilities, designed to be able to detect and suppress electronic command-and-control systems as well as the radars of surface-to air and air-to-air missiles.
Ground platforms can be Soldier or platform-based, mounted on BTRs (Russia’s amphibious personnel carrier) or other vehicles. Russian EW also includes large, powerful and highly versatile ground-based systems located in military districts for the purposes of homeland defense
Citations
http://www.voltairenet.org/article185860.html
http://www.smh.com.au/world/russia-jets-simulated-attack-passes-near-us-destroyer-20160413-go5w1x.html
http://www.veteranstoday.com/2014/11/13/aegis-fail-in-black-sea-ruskies-burn-down-uss-donald-duck/
http://www.drs.com/sitrep/q1-2016-the-invisible-fight/modern-russian-electronic-warfare/
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/754236/russia-raf-bombers-syria-hacking-missions-military-army
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