Germany’s Weimar Ghosts – And Lessons

[Y_Participant 4591]

Germany’s Weimar Ghosts – And Lessons [1] [2]

Harold James is Professor of History and International Affairs at Princeton University and a senior fellow at the Center for International Governance Innovation. A specialist on German economic history and on globalization, he is a co-author of the new book The Euro and The Battle of Ideas, and the author of The Creation and Destruction of Value: The Globalization Cycle, Krupp: A History of the Legendary German Firm, and Making the European Monetary Union.

The collapse of the Weimar Republic and the emergence of the Nazis’ Third Reich in the early 1930s still stands as one of modern history’s most powerful cautionary tales. Its lessons are as relevant today as ever – and not just for countries with fragile political systems.

Since the beginning of the Federal Republic, in 1949, one question has always haunted German politics: Could the experience of the interwar Weimar Republic be repeated, with the radical right triumphing again? Now that a far-right party has won seats in the Bundestag for the first time, the question has stepped out of the shadows.

PRINCETON – Since the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, Germans have looked back anxiously to the collapse of the Weimar Republic in the early 1930s and the rise of Nazism. But with many of the world’s democracies under growing strain and authoritarianism on the rise, the lessons of that period should be heeded elsewhere as well.

Start with the fact that economic shocks – for example, inflationary spirals, depressions, and banking crises – are challenges to all governments, everywhere and always. Economic insecurity and hardship persuade people that any regime must be better than the current one. This is an obvious lesson not just from the Weimar years, but also from a large body of research on the economic logic of democracy.

A second key lesson is that under extreme economic conditions, proportional representation (PR) can make matters worse. When a country’s politics are fragmented, PR is more likely to deliver an incoherent electoral majority, usually comprising parties on the far left and the far right that want to reject “the system,” but agree on little else.

Taken together, these two lessons constitute the conventional wisdom among political scientists about the Weimar experience. Too often, though, each lesson is considered in isolation, leading to a dangerous sense of complacency. The first argument lulls people into thinking that only an extreme economic crisis can threaten the political system; the second leads people to assume – incorrectly – that non-PR systems are inherently more robust.

To preempt complacency, it helps to consider eight further lessons from the Weimar era.

First, referenda are dangerous, especially when they are rarely used and the electorate has little experience with them. In the Weimar Republic, the National Socialists had virtually disappeared by 1929. But that year, the party was able to reestablish itself by campaigning in a fiercely fought referendum over post-World War I reparations.

Second, dissolving parliaments prematurely when the law does not require it is risky, to say the least. Even a vote that creates the basis for new elections can be interpreted as an admission that democracy has failed. In July 1932, the Nazis won the largest share of the vote (37%) in a free but legally unnecessary election. The previous election had been held less than two years earlier, and another one was not due until 1934.

Third, constitutions don’t necessarily protect the system. The Weimar constitution, designed by some of the day’s most insightful and ethical experts (including Max Weber), was near-perfect. But when unanticipated events – whether foreign-policy dramas or domestic unrest – are interpreted as emergencies requiring an extra-legal framework, constitutional protections can erode rapidly. And the enemies of democracy can foment such events.

Similarly, a fourth lesson is that business lobbyists can play a baleful behind-the-scenes role in undermining agreement between parliamentary factions.

Fifth, a political culture in which leaders demonize their opponents erodes democracy. In the Weimar Republic, that pattern began before the Nazis became a significant force. In 1922, Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau was assassinated, after having been subjected to an intense, often anti-Semitic campaign of hatred from the nationalist right. Soon thereafter, Chancellor Joseph Wirth, a center-left Catholic, turned to the right-wing parties in parliament and said, “Democracy – yes, but not the kind of democracy that bangs on the table and says: We are now in power!” He concluded his admonition by declaring that, “The enemy is on the right” – a statement that ended up only fanning the flames of tribalism even more.

Sixth, the president’s family can be dangerous. In Weimar, the aged field marshal Paul von Hindenburg was elected president in 1925, and reelected in 1932. But by the early 1930s, after several small strokes, he was suffering from dementia, and his weak and incapable son, Oskar, controlled all access to him. The result was that he ended up signing whatever agreements were presented to him.

Seventh, an insurgent group does not need to have an overall majority to control politics, even in a PR system. The largest share of the vote that the Nazis ever captured was 37%, in July 1932; in another election held that November, their support had fallen to 33%. Unfortunately, that decline led other parties to underestimate the Nazis, and to regard them as a possible coalition partner.

Eighth, incumbents can survive by buying off a discontented populace for some time, but not forever. In the Weimar era, the German state provided generous municipal housing, local government services, agricultural and industrial subsidies, and a large civil service; but it financed those outlays with debt.

To be sure, the Weimar Republic initially appeared to have a miracle economy. It was only later that German politics soured, as the government sought foreign support. Other countries found it hard to believe the government’s warnings that, without speedy assistance, a political catastrophe would ensue. And it would have been harder still to convince their own electorates to bail out Germany.

It is often assumed that countries with majoritarian electoral systems like those in the United States or the United Kingdom are more resilient than countries with PR systems. After all, America and Britain’s democracies are older, with more deeply entrenched cultures of political civility.

In reality, though, these systems can still become vulnerable over time. For example, the extent to which a country’s economy depends on foreign savings (“other people’s money”) may be politically irrelevant for long periods. But with current-account deficits of 3.7% of GDP in the US and 3% in the UK projected for this year, a reckoning could be in order, especially if isolationist nationalism among American and British voters produces disenchantment among their foreign creditors.

Germany’s election result presents an odd paradox. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union is unquestionably the strongest party, and a new government without it is unthinkable. But both the CDU and its previous coalition partner, the Social Democrats (SPD), did poorly. Many SPD leaders’ initial reaction to their party’s 20.4% showing (down from 25.7% in 2013) has been to embrace a stint in the opposition.

That response – a flight from power – was characteristic of politics in the Weimar Republic. Since the beginning of the Federal Republic, in 1949, one question has always haunted German politics: Could the Weimar experience be repeated, with the radical right triumphing again? Now that an extremist party, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), has won seats in the Bundestag for the first time since World War II, the question has stepped out of the shadows.

There are some obvious Weimar parallels. In Weimar, even in the relatively stable years of the mid- and late 1920s, before the onset of the Great Depression, parties were punished by voters when they participated in government, and rewarded when they styled themselves as alternative or protest parties. Between 1924 and 1928, the moderate right was in a coalition government, and then suffered massively; after 1928, the SPD was similarly punished for joining a coalition.

Then came the depression, and the same mechanism applied even more forcefully: it was political suicide to support the government – or, as the increasingly radical opposition called it, the system. The result was a flight from responsibility, with voters punishing the politicians who remained ever more severely

But governments are like people: after a long time in one position, they run out of ideas.

At the end of 2016, Merkel looked tired, and a new SPD leader, Martin Schulz, benefited from a short-lived burst of support in opinion polls. But when it turned out that Schulz had no new ideas, either, enthusiasm gave way to disenchantment.

The government coalition’s poor showing seems to be a clear reflection of widespread frustration with leaders who have nothing new to offer. And the election result will make a new coalition difficult to form. The most plausible – in fact the only – real alternative to a CDU-SPD grand coalition would be a larger grouping involving both the liberal Free Democrats (FDP) and the Greens (a so-called Jamaica coalition, because the parties’ colors are those of the Jamaican flag).

It is often said that Merkel would have liked a CDU-Green coalition alone, as she has moved very close to the Greens’ agenda in many areas since announcing a rapid exit from nuclear energy after Japan’s 2011 Fukushima disaster. But a Jamaica coalition will be difficult to negotiate, because the FDP is much more conservative on many economic issues, especially fiscal transfers to the rest of the eurozone.

Germany cannot break out of the Weimar trap by thinking solely in German terms.The answer to political uncertainty is to stabilize the European and international systems.

That was the final lesson of Weimar politics: it was when the international order had disintegrated that the gains from domestic cooperation looked meager and the cost of radical rhetoric dropped. Only a stable Europe can keep the ghosts of the past at bay.

Citations
[1] https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/weimar-republic-lessons-for-today-by-harold-james-2018-05
[2] https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/germany-election-weimar-ghosts-by-harold-james-2017-09

[743 roadmasterParticipant]

None of that is relevant with out the key which is the Treaty of Versailles. Which opens up everything that went on in WW1.

mgtow is its own worst enemy- https://www.campusreform.org/

[GrumpyParticipant]

Perhaps I am being flippant.
It is just history repeating itself.
It happens every time the legitimate needs of the many are usurped, and the “peasants” are progressively disenfranchised by the desires of a few in a position of power.

There was a time in my life when I gave a fuck. Now you have to pay ME for it

[OldBillParticipant]

743 roadmaster wrote:

None of that is relevant with out the key which is the Treaty of Versailles.

No. Versailles is an excuse, not a reason, and it’s an excuse Germans of all political stripes have been using since 1919. The Treaty of Sèvres, the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, and the Treaty of Trianon didn’t turn Turkey, Austria, and Hungary respectively into a dangerous powers bent on revenge, but somehow we’re supposed to believe Versailles and Versailles alone is responsible for Germany becoming one?

Of the Central Powers, only Germany chose to believe she hadn’t been beaten and only Germans not Austrians, Hungarians, or Turks, came to believe that their nation had been “stabbed in the back”. That lie, which was created domestic political purposes, still poisons discussions today.

When you compare the treaty the Allies imposed at Versailles to the treaty the Germans imposed at Brest-Litovsk, you realize that Germany got off lightly and the fact that Germany got off lightly is the real problem with Treaty of Versailles. The treaty was too harsh to be lenient and too lenient to be harsh. Germany should have either been slapped down or let off. Half measures, no matter how well meant, wouldn’t work.

As it was, Germany was punished just enough to be constantly reminded it had lost while not being punished enough to remember why it had lost.

Do not date. Do not impregnate. Do not co-habitate. Above all, do not marry. Reclaim and never again surrender your personal sovereignty.

[PistolPeteParticipant 27143]

WOW a country looses a war and needs slapped down and looses territory what novel thought–hey somebody let the arabs into that little secret—they have lost three wars against Israel and seem to feel they should get a mulligan—a do over. And they can’t seem to understand loosing territory when they loose a war. Maybe they need slapped down harder too. So I agree with Old Bill!

[Y_Participant 4591]

743 roadmaster wrote:

None of that is relevant with out the key which is the Treaty of Versailles. Which opens up everything that went on in WW1.

The object of this post is to summarise political events in Germany after the Great War that contributed to the Weimar political and social system being unable to cope with events leading to WWII.

The lessons are still there and they apply to all countries today. This is what I hope can be extracted from this topic.

[RomulusParticipant 4667]

Germany cannot break out of the Weimar trap by thinking solely in German terms.The answer to political uncertainty is to stabilize the European and international systems

Not if part of the agenda of the folks that run the European and international systems…… includes importing millions of foreigners in to your country that don’t have any stake, understanding, or respect for their culture. Whether you want them or not.

The (European/western) international order is being broken on the back of forced immigration. People may sell a bit of their soul to the international bankers, which is what most the so called “international order” is about, as long as they have a home and a nice Tv and a car and some vacation.

But they will fight and even die to protect their culture.

Also, much of what is called the EU, is basically Germany and France. Perhaps the Poles and the folks in Eastern Europe care to run their own affairs, their own way, the Germans be damned The last time the German’s were there they made a big hash of things.

How can a woman be expected to be happy with a man who insists on treating her as if she were a perfectly normal human being.

[743 roadmasterParticipant]

OldBill wrote:

743 roadmaster wrote:

None of that is relevant with out the key which is the Treaty of Versailles.

No. Versailles is an excuse, not a reason, and it’s an excuse Germans of all political stripes have been using since 1919. The Treaty of Sèvres, the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, and the Treaty of Trianon didn’t turn Turkey, Austria, and Hungary respectively into a dangerous powers bent on revenge, but somehow we’re supposed to believe Versailles and Versailles alone is responsible for Germany becoming one?

Of the Central Powers, only Germany chose to believe she hadn’t been beaten and only Germans not Austrians, Hungarians, or Turks, came to believe that their nation had been “stabbed in the back”. That lie, which was created domestic political purposes, still poisons discussions today.

When you compare the treaty the Allies imposed at Versailles to the treaty the Germans imposed at Brest-Litovsk, you realize that Germany got off lightly and the fact that Germany got off lightly is the real problem with Treaty of Versailles. The treaty was too harsh to be lenient and too lenient to be harsh. Germany should have either been slapped down or let off. Half measures, no matter how well meant, wouldn’t work.

As it was, Germany was punished just enough to be constantly reminded it had lost while not being punished enough to remember why it had lost.

No one,…well except you have that notion of the events. The men who signed the treaty went to the grave knowing the massive mistake made.

Y_ wrote:

743 roadmaster wrote:

None of that is relevant with out the key which is the Treaty of Versailles. Which opens up everything that went on in WW1.

The object of this post is to summarise political events in Germany after the Great War that contributed to the Weimar political and social system being unable to cope with events leading to WWII.

The lessons are still there and they apply to all countries today. This is what I hope can be extracted from this topic.

All events after WW1 are tied into the treaty. No discussion can be held about the republic with out the elephant in the room. Treaty of Versailles.
Which brought WW2 and the crap house Germany is today.
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/marxs-birth-town-celebrates-anniversary-big-statue-54955120

Marx hometown unveils huge statue on 200th birth anniversary

mgtow is its own worst enemy- https://www.campusreform.org/

[Y_Participant 4591]

743 roadmaster wrote:

All events after WW1 are tied into the treaty. No discussion can be held about the republic with out the elephant in the room. Treaty of Versailles.

The study does not need to delve into specifics of any particular political situation or agreement. The rise of any despotic regime is tied to the political system that it is able to subvert. Any treaty or political situation can be used – if this treaty was not used it would have been something else. Extremists mine the weakness of a political system for regime change.

Riding on common grievances which in political terms was considered a minority, the Nazis were able to achieve control of a well managed democracy.

Are we sure this could not happen today? We know the signs are there – in the UK, France, the USA, Russia, Iran and other areas of the world the same pattern is unfolding.

This is what I am trying to project. The political system should be robust enough to accommodate significant political and economic hardships to survive. Without these countermeasures a political collapse is assured and state wars or a civil war not far behind. How does that help anyone?

[OldBillParticipant]

743 roadmaster wrote:

The men who signed the treaty went to the grave knowing the massive mistake made.

Yes, because as I already wrote, the treaty was too harsh to be lenient and too lenient to be harsh. Foch memorably noted that it wasn’t a treaty as much as it was a ceasefire. Another French participant correctly predicted war within a generation. Germany should have either been treated magnanimously, as Churchill noted by the early 1920s while writing The World Crisis, or occupied and reorganized as was done after WW2. Instead, the Allies attempted to impose the punishment they felt Germany needed without doing the actual work such punishments required.

As the Allies first backed away from enforcement and then renegotiated parts of the Treaty, Germany’s belief that Versailles was somehow “unfair” was reinforced. Regardless of the flaws in the Versailles Treaty or the Allies failure to enforce it, Germany’s post-1919 actions were nothing more than a continuation of it’s pre-1914 actions. Those actions were a choice made by it’s people and it’s politicians. Versailles was merely a convenient excuse for passions and opinions which already existed and not the reason for the same.

Turkey lost an empire which stretched from Adrianople/Edirne to Aremnia to Aden to Qatar, saw Istanbul occupied, and watched Greek armies nearly take Ankara. Despite that, Turkey didn’t devolve into a fascist aggressor state with territorial designs on her neighbors while blaming everything on the Treaty of Sevres. Austria too lost an empire as did her co-equal in it Hungary. Neither of them waved San Stefano around like a bloody shirt to excuse their post-1919 choices either. Only Germany remained a postwar problem and that is because Germany had been a prewar problem.

All events after WW1 are tied into the treaty. No discussion can be held about the republic with out the elephant in the room. Treaty of Versailles. Which brought WW2 and the crap house Germany is today.

No. All events are tied to mindset Germany already had prior to WW1. The Treaty didn’t create that mindset. The Treaty just became a convenient excuse for Germany’s preexisting mindset, an excuse which too many people still believe today.

The parallels between the political thoughts and foreign policies of Wilhelmine, Weimar, and Nazi Germany are too numerous to list. It was Weimar Germany, for example, which began rearmament in defiance of the treaty with secret programs built subs in Holland and Finland while tanks and aircraft were tested in the USSR. There is a continuity of German political thought and foreign policy stretching from 1871 to 1945. WW1 and Versailles were just momentary detours on that 75 year long road.

Germany’s behavior was set long before Versailles and it took the gotterdammerung of ’45 plus a near 50 year occupation to change it.

Do not date. Do not impregnate. Do not co-habitate. Above all, do not marry. Reclaim and never again surrender your personal sovereignty.

[743 roadmasterParticipant]

Worth the discussion or not. The trivialities abound. No it is not, has no comparison to what is going on anywhere in the world today. On top of that other issues have more value in talking about then the WR and the fall out from the ToV.

mgtow is its own worst enemy- https://www.campusreform.org/

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